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In the early hours of the eighth of January 2017, a wind turbine rotor blade was 
carefully manoeuvred through the streets of the city of Hull in the north of England. 
Its slow journey ended in Queen Victoria Square, the heart of the city centre, where 
it was installed on two purpose-built plinths. The 75-metre blade arched gracefully 
across this usually busy public gathering place. Hull was beginning its year as the 
2017 UK City of Culture. Awarded every four years, the City of Culture designation 
aims to attract tourism and investment, direct urban regeneration, and provide 
opportunities for engagement in the arts for the local community. Nayan Kulkarni’s 
Blade was to be the first of a series of installations that marked the city’s eventful past 




The rotor blade had not travelled far. In November 2014, Siemens—the largest 
electronics and manufacturing corporation in Europe—announced that it had chosen 
Hull as the location for a new factory for the production of wind turbines. It was 
from the new factory, which began operating in December 2016, that Kulkarni had 
borrowed the blade. The Siemens’s facility occupies most of the city’s old Alexandra 
Dock, which was opened in 1885 by the Hull, Barnsley & West Riding Junction 
Railway and Dock Company, primarily as a means to export coal from the collieries 
of South Yorkshire. The dock had been largely unused and derelict though since the 
early 1980s.  
 Located on the Humber estuary on the east coast of Britain, Hull provides an 
ideal site for the manufacture of turbines destined for the numerous offshore arrays 
currently being assembled in the North Sea. These arrays supply energy to a British 
electricity grid still chiefly dependent on natural gas and aging, expensive nuclear 
plants.  
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 For a number of interwoven geographic and political reasons, energy 
production has long been a prominent industry in this corner of the world. Just a 
few hundred metres to the east of the site of the new Siemens factory is the Salt End 
power station and chemical processing plant, owned by BP. Further round the coast, 
the huge Langeled pipeline comes ashore near the village of Easington, bringing 
natural gas across the North Sea from Norway. Opposite Hull on the south bank of 
the estuary are two vast oil refineries. At both plants, the gas flares that burn off 
excess fumes extend over fifty metres into the sky. On clear nights, the bright flames 
hang over the estuary like artificial stars, the visible signs of an otherwise opaque, 
security-fenced process. Further to the west, the grey cooling towers of the coal-fired 
power plants at Drax and Eggborough stand out among the flat, green landscape.  
 I visited Blade in March of 2017, on the last day of its residency in the city 
centre. It was a windy and rainy afternoon, but even under the low, grey sky, Blade 
was a remarkable spectacle. The new generation of turbine blades made at the 
Siemens factory are cast as a single piece of reinforced polymer. The matte finish of 
the blade produced a strange optical illusion: even viewing it in person, it looked 




If, as many critics have noted, the energy dependencies of the Global North have 
largely been obscured or elided for much of the last century, then Blade seemed to 
offer a different kind of account of how the lights will stay on in the future. Here was 
the industrial sublime refitted for the twenty-first century and strategically 
positioned at the heart of a low-lying, flood-prone city. Blade’s intended symbolism 
seemed clear—this sleek, futuristic technology guarantees skilled jobs and 
investment in the local area in the short to medium term, as well as intimating a 
broader transition to renewable energy in the longer term. In this sense, Blade was a 
striking synecdoche for what corporations like Siemens would have us believe is an 
ecologically benign, even ameliorative “green capitalism.” By capturing the 
inexhaustible force of one element, it seemed to suggest, we might ward off 
inundation by another, so that life, and the business of capital accumulation, can 
continue as usual. 
 Given our planetary mess, I’m sure we can all agree that the opening of any 
facility manufacturing components for renewable arrays is, by and large, a good 
Blade in Queen Victoria Square. Photo © Thomas Arran. Reproduced with permission of the 
photographer and Absolutely Cultured.
thing. But as I hope this brief account of Blade makes clear, I felt ambivalent about 
the installation and the kind of future it brings into view. And it’s only fair to note at 
this point that the artist’s own comments on Blade and the long-term prospect of a 
meaningful energy transition displayed a similar ambivalence. In an interview 
shortly after the installation was revealed, Kulkarni reflected on how wind turbines: 
 
Are a necessary stopgap between the transformations in global 
relationships to new sources of energy and energy usage. However, like 
many technological teleologys [sic], we (the global rich) end up not 
having to make significant cultural and geo-political decisions for twenty 
years, as these decisions do not yet satisfy our hunger for energy – they 
just satiate it. Indeed, they defer more complex choices to the future. 
[…] 
[Wind turbines] are an emblem of the future, the defining form of the 
twenty-first century and symbolise a particular idea of the future. Indeed, 
they seem like a hopeful future and because of this, European energy 
politics becomes centred on them. Yet wind turbines cannot solve long 
term issues on their own, they are more of a palliative.  
(3rd Dimension, 2017: n.p.) 
 
There are various reasons that I won’t go into here to be skeptical about Siemens’s 
commitment to the places where they locate their factories, and about the kind of 
future the company envisages. Suffice it to say, their plan is to remain in the city for 
as long as it is profitable to do so; that is, for as long as they are the beneficiaries of 
tax breaks and of reduced regulations that enable them to devour as much of the 
human energy of their workers as they can, in a city with a recent history of 
widespread unemployment and underemployment.  
 With all this in mind, we can think of Blade as what T. J. Demos calls a 
“selective abstraction”. Siemens’ property temporarily became public sculpture, but 
Blade’s bright green aesthetics elided many of the more difficult and pressing 
questions of political ecology and environmental justice in a city perched 
precariously on a rapidly eroding coastline. Because for all the public and corporate 
investment in the city over the last five years, municipal funding has been decimated 
by central government cuts: Hull City Council has lost more than £106 million from 
its budget since 2010 and further cuts are on the way in what has long been one of 
the most deprived local authorities in the country. These cuts have had a particular 
impact on education and social provision; they also restrict the city’s capacity to 
prepare for rising sea levels in the future. Central government funding has recently 
been invested in a number of flood defence schemes in the area, but bigger walls will 
only keep rising seas at bay from some communities for a while. The question of 
who pays for large-scale adaptation, particularly the much-needed improvements to 
housing stock in the poorest areas of the city, has long been deferred. For many 
residents, ‘property-level protection’ like air bricks, antiflood doors, and non-return 
valves, as well as energy-efficiency measures, are prohibitively expensive. Risk is not 
shared equally in this city, as in all others, and a very different account of its likely 
future looms on the horizon.  
 As Ashley Dawson argues in his recent book Extreme Cities, and as has 
become especially clear in Hull, planetary-scale renewable energy transition and 
localised adaptation and resilience-building sometimes aim at similar ends but are 
not really the same story. Dawson argues convincingly that amid the environmental 
breakdown of the present, cities occupy an odd position: they are at once 
“hypervisible” as the locus of various forms of innovation and self-proclaimed 
“smart” design. At the same time, the realities of urban life—and particularly urban 
inequality—are frequently ignored or overwritten by forms of planning that cleave 
to the interests of real estate developers and big business. One of the things 
municipal and national authorities have so far been unable or unwilling to do, 
Dawson argues convincingly, is to make plans that prioritise communal affluence 
and public safety over the continuing accumulation of private profit. The result of 
this vast failure of the imagination and political purpose will be to put already 
disadvantaged groups in the path of further harm. This is not quite the same failure 
of imagination identified by Amitav Ghosh, as mentioned by Tiffany Werth in the 






These are broad concerns, but I broach them here in order to signal some of the ways 
far-reaching questions about power, political ecology and environmental justice 
catch on the smooth surface of Blade. In the broader research project from which this 
paper draws, I dwell in detail on the dual sense of “power” as it refers both to 
energy systems and sociopolitical systems. I also focus on how our modern energy 
and transport infrastructures overlay older stories and material records of loss and, 
in some cases, recovery, via what I’ve come to think of as a local genealogy of risk 
and climactic transformation. In the time I have left I want to signal some of this 
project’s likely directions via three particular works, as well some of the broader 
themes they invoke when read as part of an attempt to think dialectically about the 
relationship between the local and global. 
 The first is the medieval Chronicle of Meaux, written around 1410, which 
records the loss of numerous settlements along the Humber estuary and adjoining 
Holderness coastline over the course of the twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries. Most notably, the Chronicle describes in stark detail the inundation of the 
port of Ravenser Odd, which once sat at the mouth of the Humber. In the 1290s the 
town was powerful enough to send two MPs to parliament in London. But by the 
middle of the fourteenth century it had been reclaimed by a combination of the 
steady workings of the tide. The Chronicle records that “a few ornaments, images, 
books and a bell” were sold to the church at Easington, the village where the 
Langeled pipeline now comes ashore, but that many other objects were nicked by 
retreating inhabitants, perhaps understandably given that they may well have lost 
all else. More gruesomely, the bodies of those buried in the churchyard were also 
relocated, because they had been “washed up and uncovered” by the inundation of 
the sea.  
 This was clearly not what some geographers, anthropologists, and local 
activists have taken to calling a “planned” or “managed retreat”—if the Chronicle is 
anything to go by, the last days of Ravenser Odd were marked by accusations of 
theft and their recriminations, rather than by any kind of collective response to rising 
waters. For all the distance between premodern past and our present, the Chronicle 
raises a question that is already on the lips of some in Hull: namely, what are the 
prospects of planning retreat not in a piecemeal and decollectivizing fashion, but as 
a community, and therefore as the result of a deliberative, maybe even democratic 
process? Or, to put it more bluntly, when the time comes, who does the planning in 
the “planned retreat” of at-risk communities? Further, as Liz Koslov argues in a 
recent article tracing the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy in New York and the actions 
of the Oakwood Beach Buyout Committee on Staten Island, retreat should invoke 
not just physical retreat from particular places, but also a broader retreat from 
particular ways of life that we know are unsustainable. I would only add that I 
would explicitly call this a retreat from capitalist globalisation and neoliberalism into 
climate internationalism and ecosocialism.  
 John Lyly’s late sixteenth-century play Galatea (c.1580) begins with a similar 
scene of destruction to that recounted in the Chronicle: in this instance, a vivid 
description of a devastating flood tide that once submerged a community on the 
south bank of the Humber. This scene has justifiably invited its own recent flood of 
present-minded interpretation, so I want to dwell instead on another scene later in 
the first act, in which the character of the Mariner, equipped with compass and 
lodestone, proclaims man’s navigational and technological mastery over the sea. “I 
fear the sea no more than a dish of water,” he tells Raffe, Robin and Dick, the three 
brothers at the heart of the play’s subplot, “Why, fools, it is but a liquid element” 
(Galatea, 1.4.39-40).  
 The Mariner’s comic hubris is clear enough here; after all, he and the brothers 
have just been shipwrecked and washed ashore clinging grimly to a plank of wood. 
But standing on a spot close to where container ships now pass—laden with timber, 
steel, cement, and solid fuel—the Mariner briefly but significantly describes a 
miniaturized and domesticated world, a world that can be traversed with relative 
speed. Increasingly accurate navigational tools formed part not only of a technical 
array, but also of a developing epistemology that would enable European colonial 
nations to lay claim to a world that was ever more knowable, divisible, and ownable.  
The Mariner’s claim also directs us toward a more local history, though one 
that would also have significant and far-reaching consequences. Just over three 
decades after Galatea was written, the land where the play is set underwent a 
profound transformation. In 1626, the Dutch engineer Cornelius Vermuyden 
planned the draining of Hatfield Chase and the surrounding area, expelling or 
redirecting the “liquid element”, and turning wetlands into cultivatable pastures. I 
don’t want to say too much about this land reclamation scheme, because I know Liza 
McIntosh will be talking about it in more detail later in this panel. But I do want to 
point out that the ensuing conflict between local farmers and other inhabitants on 
one side, and the wealthy funders and beneficiaries of the scheme on the other, 
represented only the latest battle in a war that had begun with the enclosure of the 
commons in the fourteenth century. Denied access to peat bogs, on which they relied 
for fuel, local inhabitants rioted and disrupted work on the drainage scheme; formal 
legal challenges around the scheme and its effects would not be settled until well 
into the following century.   
Further, and as Louise Noble examines in her recent account of nineteenth-
century Australia in Vin Nardizzi and Tiffany Werth’s Premodern Ecologies collection, 
the land reclamation schemes carried out in England during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries became an important element in the British colonial project. 
Noble traces how British colonisers took with them not just specific hydrological 
practices and technologies, but also powerful cultural norms and ideas about the 
role of water and how the local landscape should look—namely, verdant and green—
and whose interests should be the basis for its management; namely, those of the 
new settlers, rather than the indigenous populations who had arrived at significantly 
more sustainable ways of using local watercourses.  
 The last of the three works I want to consider returns us to Hull’s year as City 
of Culture and provides a dystopian tale of what life in the city could soon look like. 
The month after Blade returned to the Siemens factory, Flood was staged outdoors in 




An ambitious combination of theatre and short film, Flood told the story of how two 
fishermen in the North Sea bring their nets aboard to discover a woman nestled 
among a haul of empty lifejackets, miraculously alive 70 metres down. She has 
tattoos of scales on her arms and the name Gloriana across her knuckles. The 
fishermen take her ashore to the so-called City by the Sea, a thinly-veiled version of 
Hull in the near future, now with a detention camp for climate refugees who have 
been found adrift in nearby waters. When Gloriana is brought ashore it starts to rain 
and doesn’t stop, transforming the city into an archipelago of three separate islands, 
each of which soon develops its own distinct politics: one lives by a cult of Gloriana 
worship; one is harshly repressive and intolerant; and the third is democratic and 
largely communal, if uneasily so. Gloriana dies and then returns, prompting a final, 
violent clash.  
 
Flood (2017), James Phillips and Slung Low Productions. Photo © Thomas Arran
 
 
 Flood’s medieval and early modern influences were clear, and not just in the 
choice of Gloriana’s name and its echoes of the plot of Galatea—the play’s structure 
and staging also resembled the medieval mystery cycle, in which the story of the 
biblical Flood would be performed by the Fishers and Mariners’ guild. The play 
revolved around a characteristically modern issue though, and one that has only 
become more complex in the intervening two years: the flow of migrants to Europe 
from the Middle East and North and Central Africa, a flow that many argue is set to 
intensify as climate change intersects with and catalyses existing forms of social and 
political unrest.  
 Flood was uneven in its execution—with more attention paid to its visual set 
pieces than the often-stodgy script. But one of the things that it did draw attention to 
is that just as there is no such thing as a “natural disaster”, so-called “refugee crises” 
are never really refugee crises, rather they are crises of borders and the idea of 
citizenship that are long in the making, and in which climate, capitalism, racism, and 
the legacies of colonialism and imperialism are all tightly interwoven.  
Photo © Sarah Zagni
With this in mind, Flood should also remind us that for all the initial 
explanatory usefulness of the Anthropocene thesis, there is no singular Anthropos, no 
organic or undifferentiated humanity. To echo a point a number of presenters have 
made over the last few days, I would argue that an alternative ‘-cene’, that of the 
“Capitalocene” offers a more rigorous way to trace the vast ecological entanglements 
within which we live, and whose origins can, if you follow Jason W. Moore’s thesis, 




For all of the guarded optimism in Hull during its year as City of Culture, the 
prospect of rising seas weighed heavily, understandably so when roughly 95% of the 
city is on a flood plain and has suffered regular inundations since the disastrous 
flood of summer 2007, when months of rain fell in a single afternoon. Flood was an 
impressive and timely spectacle, but it was just one of a number of works that I saw 
that seemed to attest to how difficult it can be to imagine a different, more equitable 
future, a future that exceeds what Lynne Segal calls “mere accommodation to the 
known harms of the present”. In so doing, these works also raised questions about 
the relative efficacy of dystopian and utopian visions of the future, questions that 
have also been are the centre of a number of discussions over the last few days. As 
Nnedi Okorafor noted in her plenary on Wednesday, dystopia might be easier, as 
well as more commercially viable, in all sorts of ways, but optimism is or should be 
vital to our work as writers, scholars and teachers—as well as activists.  
 To close, I want to note that Okorafor’s comments also reminded me of the 
conclusion to Segal’s 2017 book Radical Happiness, which provides a compelling 
defence of both literary utopianism and more day-to-day utopian political demands 
like, for example, Universal Basic Income and a reduced working week. Segal writes 
of how envisaging a more “equitable, fairer and peaceful world” itself brings a 
“certain audacity and energy to life, at least in the sharing of such imaginings”. That 
audacity, and the energy it generates, may be some of the most valuable renewable 
resources we have.     
 
